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Drawing from Peircean semiotics, from the Greek conception of phronesis,
and from considerations of bodily awareness as a basis of reasonableness, I
attempt to show how the living gesture touches our deepest signifying
nature, the self, and public life. Gestural bodily awareness, more than knowl-
edge, connects us with the very conditions out of which the human body
evolved into its present condition and remains a vital resource in the face
of a devitalizing, rationalistic consumption culture. It may be precisely
these deep-rooted abilities for what I term “self-originated experience” that
can ultimately offset automatism.
 
UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT WORDS
 
One can lie with the mouth, but with the accompanying grimace one neverthe-
less tells the truth.
—Nietzsche
Conversation in gestures may be carried on which cannot be translated into ar-
ticulate speech. This is also true of the lower animals. Dogs approaching each
other in hostile attitude carry on such a language of gestures. They walk
around each other, growling and snapping, and waiting for the opportunity to
attack.
—Mead 1934:13–14
 
Imagine creatures who gather together to bay and rub sticks and hairs together and
blow through tubes, in front of creatures who sit silently and, only after the sound-
ritual is completed, respond by showing teeth and hitting open hands together, and,
when they really get going, stomping feet in a frenzy of gesturalized emotion. Ah
civilization! Ah 
 
Homo symphonicus!
 
Though we like to think of ourselves as creatures of the tongue, communication
between people is largely rooted in conversations of gestures. We converse in public
contexts through our faces and gazes and bodily language, through mostly subcon-
scious gestures of communication and entrancement, and not simply through our
verbal utterances (Birdwhistell 1970; Darwin [1872] 1998; Hall 1959, 1967, 1983).
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Despite the significance accorded gestural communication in the work of G. H.
Mead, kinesics, and communication studies, there remains insufficient appreciation,
in my view, for how deeply the bodily centered signifying moment pervades social
life. Many contemporary theories uncritically assume that signs are purely conven-
tional, yet such views simply cannot do justice to the broader range of gestural,
iconic, and even biological aspects of human signification in their own terms. Hence
I outline here my view of how the living gesture touches our deepest signifying na-
ture, the self, and public life more generally. Mead’s concept of the generalized
other, though a good starting point, needs to be supplemented by a more detailed
understanding of body semiotics, one that can bridge the prehistoric world of
hunter-gatherers—from whom our present bodies are shaped—with that of con-
temporary technoculture, in which our present bodies live.
 
1
 
The Greek term 
 
phronesis
 
, usually translated as “prudence” or practical knowl-
edge, had an early literal meaning for the area around the heart (
 
phren
 
), including
the life-breathing lungs. To say that the heart and lungs are associated with reason-
ableness seems odd to a modern person knowledgeable about the brain. For we live
in the mechanical universe described by Thomas Hobbes in 
 
Leviathan
 
, where he
stated, “For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings.” Yet
the living, breathing, pulsing, bodily center of gravity makes great sense when one
shifts from a conception of 
 
knowledge
 
 to one of 
 
awareness
 
 as a basis for reasonable-
ness. For that is what we mean when we say that someone acts “with heart,” or
“from their gut,” namely, that the bodily organs of awareness—of the perceptive
practice of the senses, emotions, and imagination—are brought to bear in the moment
for interpretation and for acting upon the situation.
In Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics, phronesis, or practical knowledge, is a
commonsense reservoir of experiences and prejudices, of tempered habits that enter
into conduct. Gadamer’s lengthy debate with Jürgen Habermas concerned whether
phronesis was more like what Habermas would later call “communicative rational-
ity” or more a context-specific kind of knowledge, capable of responding with right
judgment to a situation (Gadamer 1980).
It seems to me that Gadamer had the more persuasive argument, yet I am claiming
that phronesis is something even more than a kind of knowledge. Phronesis is the
breathing, palpitating (
 
phren
 
 
 

 
 heart area) bodily awareness of the situation, the spon-
taneous soul brought to bear on life. It is the living gesture bodied forth in the signify-
ing moment, connecting us with the very conditions out of which the human body
evolved into its present condition. It is the living heritage of our hunter-gatherer
bodies, evolved to attune themselves to a living and signifying environment.
The human self is an organic sign-complex rooted in socialization processes that
include not only cultural values and personal experience but also biological devel-
opment and in-tempered capacities of the human genome itself. The roots of the hu-
man self remain connected to wildness. This wildness is not the antisocial conception
of the unconscious Freud proposed, or the antisocial conception of nature that
Hobbes earlier elaborated and from which Freud drew. Rather, this wildness within
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derives from socially in-tempered capacities of the human body, in-tempered forms
of reasonableness, of sensing and communicative abilities originating in our hunter-
gatherer and even primate and mammalian past (Shepard 1998).
The self goes far deeper than discourse, and the spontaneous self can also do
“self-constructing.” That, after all, is what living is about. Using your gut sense in
practical situations does not mean justifying your ideology, and does not mean
some uncanny automatic correct response. It means cultivating a center of gravity
stemming from one’s passions rather than from one’s rational thought and allowing
that deeper center of gravity to sense situations and speak freely in the dialogue of
mind. A center of gravity rooted in the passions by no means ensures correct con-
duct but only openness to a broader base of information on which to act. The re-
sources of passionate reasonableness, like rationality, must be cultivated in experi-
ence, practiced in felt situations.
Without such cultivation, one has no gut sense on which to act but only some im-
mature infantile needs, perhaps disguised by rationales. Unfortunately, modern civ-
ilization has tended to favor precisely such creatures, emotionally infantilized,
rationally hyperdeveloped: the spiritless specialists and heartless hedonists to whom
Max Weber called attention. That is why Albert Speer commented that when Hitler
raved and ranted at meetings he did not necessarily mean what he said, but when he
spoke in a cool, calm, and collected manner—rationally—at a meeting, he meant
business.
As the philosopher and logician Charles S. Peirce (1931:par. 627) put it more
than a century ago, “The mental qualities we most admire in all human beings ex-
cept our several selves are the maiden’s delicacy, the mother’s devotion, manly
courage, and other inheritances that have come to us from the biped who did not
yet speak; while the characters that are most contemptible take their origin in
reasoning. . . . It is the instincts, the sentiments, that make the substance of the soul.
Cognition is only its surface, its locus of contact with what is external to it.” Peirce
championed rational science, yet acknowledged that in practical conduct there are
modes of inference available that go deeper than rational inference.
Sensing situations with one’s heart, guts, genitals, or whatever bodily metaphor
seems most appropriate provides a far surer guide to the conduct of practical life
than a rational approach. The purely rational approach simply cannot sense as
much in many everyday situations and has less of a range of information on which
to make an inference. Yet the matrix of modern life would deny the spontaneous in-
telligence of the human body by formatting it to a rational-mechanical system of
calculation.
I propose that a cultural template has come to prominence, which I term the 
 
me-
chanical other
 
. We live in a world in which the mechanical other of technoculture
has been relentlessly colonizing the inner world of humanity and the outer world of
the biosphere. It represents the transformation of Mead’s model of the generalized
other into one that is anticommunity, antidemocratic, and, most important, antior-
ganic, having as its purpose the colonization and replacement of those supreme gifts
 92
 
Symbolic Interaction
 
Volume 27, Number 1, 2004
 
of our organic, sensing, and signifying nature by the dictates of the automaton. It is
a driving force in social life these days, manifesting in all the aspects of electro-
culture, from the Internet to CD burning to television to surveillance to automated
encounters . . . and on and on.
The mechanical other is more generally a social construction of the rational-
mechanical, nominalist worldview of modern life, of the “ghost in the machine” ide-
ology that splits mind into spectral consciousness or social constructions and body
into mechanical law. Yet nature and culture form a continuous polarity, not an un-
bridgeable dichotomy. The self is more than a ghost in the machine, determined by
a matrix of social constructions and language conventions. Some of the capacities of
the organic, signifying body that make us most human, such as the spontaneous ges-
ture, are precisely what the mechanical other seems intent on deleting. Yet I claim
that it may be precisely these deep-rooted abilities for what I term 
 
self-originated
experience
 
 that can ultimately offset automatism (Halton 1995, 2000).
We are live creatures, not word processors, capable of feeling, sensing, and inter-
preting the world, of opening the doors of perception that reach past the “mind
forg’d manacles” of rote habituation, of opening awareness to see the world as it
truly is: infinite. And it is the feelings, sensings, images, and gestures that open us to
the fullness of the living moment and that best feed the reflective self.
 
SIGNS OF SELF-CONSTRUCTION
 
Make me! You’re made, and what a mess!
—Children’s taunting
 
As sociologists well know, Mead’s (1934:13–14) developmental theory of the self in-
volves a progressive internalization of the other, beginning in a “conversation of
gestures,” through a level of “play” involving specific others, and culminating in a
“generalized other,” an inner representation of community who is “me” in that in-
ternal dialogue of “I” and “me” that comprises the self of self-consciousness.
In Mead’s view, it is the internalized attitudes and values of the community and
not only a specific role model that mark the fully developed human self. The extent
to which some nonhuman animals engage in these internalizing processes seems to
me an interesting question for animal researchers to explore and for social theorists
to consider. How deep do internalizing processes go? Does mother-infant bonding
characteristic of mammals mark the evolutionary beginnings of the proto-self? Do
mourning rituals exhibited by elephants, whose brain memory capacities are far
greater than those of humans, suggest a proto-self as well?
“Conversation of gestures” is often taken to mean the gestural languages of
other animals and an immature developmental level of humans, in which the child
has not yet learned how to internalize, or take the role of, the generalized other. Yet
this developmental level of the conversation of gestures is not erased by later devel-
opment but continues as a significant element of the mature generalized other
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in public life. In Gregory Bateson’s (1972:614) words: “If . . . verbal language were
in any sense an evolutionary replacement of communication by means of kinesics
and paralanguage, we would expect the old, predominantly iconic systems to have
undergone conspicuous decay. Clearly they have not. Rather, the kinesics of men
have become richer and more complex, and paralanguage has blossomed side by
side with the evolution of verbal language.”
The human ability to engage in gestural conversations retains its preconscious
animal sensing and emotional communicative origins while yet embedded in the
inner representation of social life that is the generalized other, what Mead (1922:246)
termed the
 
 significant symbol
 
:
 
 
 
“The significant symbol is then the gesture, the sign,
the word which is addressed to the self when it is addressed to another individual,
and is addressed to another, in form to all other individuals, when it is addressed to
the self.” It strikes me as interesting that in this definition, Mead stresses 
 
addressed
 
.
For the gestural level of human public life is not always conscious, though it plays a
significant role in the comprehension of utterances. Hence gestures may be “ad-
dressed” to others and to one’s self—meeting Mead’s definition of a significant
symbol—without one necessarily being aware of what the gesture, or body language,
is communicating. But they might also be more unconsciously animal as well. It is not
a question of an either/or dichotomy, for even while gesturing the significant sym-
bols of the human animal, we remain primates and mammals conversing through
gestures. That too is part of human nature; without the preverbal primate and mam-
mal within, we are less than fully human. Stated differently, wildness is not only
without but within the very structure of the human brain and body as well. Antonio
Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003) argues that emotions are not only crucial for evolution-
ary survival, but also for our ability to think. Rational thought is biologically depen-
dent on more basic emotional capacities for optimal functioning.
Mead’s theory of the generalized other throws an interesting psychological per-
spective on Aristotle’s view that man is by nature 
 
zoon politikon
 
, a political animal.
Becoming self-conscious in Mead’s general theory involves establishing an internal
 
polis
 
, or community. In contrast, Freud’s model of socialization involves establish-
ing an internal 
 
family
 
 through the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Just as Hobbes
reversed Aristotle’s conception of human nature from “public animal” to one of a
privatized, antisocial, maximizing competitor, Freud’s model represents the privati-
zation of development to a family imago erected over a purely self-gratifying uncon-
scious, a stimulus-response pleasure machine. Aristotle’s internalized 
 
polis—
 
Mead’s
generalized other—becomes Hobbes’s internalized family feud in Freud’s model, in
which the 
 
it
 
, 
 
das Es
 
, as Freud termed the unconscious in German vernacular—“id”
in English translation—is the savage state of nature within us, domesticated by the
internalized family imago.
Freud draws attention to the ways that a child internalizes the most significant
objects in the environment, the parents—an insight sorely lacking in Mead’s theory,
which does not single out the parents for special developmental attention. Freud’s
overly inward theory could have broadened Mead’s conception of the social, just as
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Mead’s model of development could have profited from Freud’s attention to the
significance of inner mother and father representations. Freud’s understanding of so-
cialization rests problematically on Hobbes’s reversal of Aristotle’s conception of
human nature to one of antisocial competitive struggle. Perhaps Freud’s Oedipal
family corresponds more to Mead’s developmental level of “play,” involving the in-
ternalization of 
 
specific
 
 others.
Yet nature and nurture remain irreconcilably quite different in the two models:
Freud’s it, or id, is rooted in Hobbes’s fiction of antisocial individualism, of a state
of nature incapable of social signification, and the I, or ego, is the nurtured resolu-
tion of the Oedipal conflict: a symbiotic triadic symbol relating boy to mother
through identification with father. This basis for the I, or self, and for symbolic con-
sciousness, is a social fiction, and all social relations are analytically reducible to
their disguised dyadic underpinnings. Despite his appreciation for the symbolic in
human affairs, Freud believed symbolic behavior would be ultimately understand-
able as stimulus-response physiology. Hence triadic symbolic interaction is reduc-
ible to dyadic physiology in his metapsychology.
Freud’s theory reveals the social fiction of nominalism, and in Hobbes and Des-
cartes we see the modern privatization of the self, in which the real social relations that
constitute
 
 zoon politikon
 
 are treated as secondary accretions (MacIntyre 1981). Yet
the short, nasty, brutish life of nature claimed by Hobbes actually corresponds to the
reverse, to the changes brought about by the institutions of civilization (Sahlins 1973).
By contrast, Mead and the other pragmatists opened the way to conceive nature
as social and significative and nurture as both natural and real. With a continuity of
nature and nurture, one can say that nature produces some social constructions,
such as mother-infant bonding, bodies them forth in human practices whose locus
remains bodily purposes, however attenuated those purposes may become (Holler
2002; Montagu 1978).
What are the machine systems now relentlessly expanding their global grip, if not
bodily purposes run amuck, of the automatic and rational aspects of our brains, over-
extended?
 
 Zoon automaton—
 
automatic animal—is the source of the modern fiction
of the id, relentlessly maximizing its private gain. Yet 
 
zoon automaton
 
 remains a
social construction of human nature, of Aristotle’s 
 
zoon politikon
 
, even though it
has the extinction of human nature as its unacknowledged 
 
telos
 
. Those empathic,
spontaneous, sensing capacities of the political animal are dangerous to that social
construction which is automatic animal.
The gestural level of communication ought to be the bodying forth of communi-
cation, even as speech is the mouthing of it. I have a book at home titled 
 
Italian
Without Words
 
, which playfully suggests that one can engage in a full public life in
Italy through the range of gestures one exhibits (if you violently disagree with this
idea, imagine the gesture you could respond with to address your disagreement).
Since the time of Mead’s writing, kinesics has shown how deeply body language is
embedded in communication.
Such public gestures are more than brute referential pointings, more than mere
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linguistic utterances. They give lie to the erroneous idea that public life is merely
linguistic utterance, found in recent pseudopragmatists such as Rorty or Habermas.
For even “linguistic utterance” itself is more than linguistic utterance, involving
deep gestural and emotional capacities (Halton 1995:226–34). Consider, for example,
the neurologist Oliver Sacks’s discussion of patients with aphasia, unable to com-
prehend the meanings of words. Often it took some time to realize their deficit, be-
cause they understood the nonverbal 
 
tone
 
 and 
 
gesture
 
 so well:
 
A . . . speech—natural speech—does 
 
not
 
 consist of words alone, nor . . . proposi-
tions alone. It consists of 
 
utterance—
 
an uttering-forth of one’s whole meaning
with one’s whole being—the understanding of which involves infinitely more
than mere word-recognition. And this was the clue to aphasiacs’ understanding,
even when they might be wholly uncomprehending of words as such. For though
the words, the verbal constructions, per se, might convey nothing, spoken lan-
guage is normally suffused with “tone,” embedded in an expressiveness which
transcends the 
 
verbal—
 
and it is precisely this expressiveness, so deep, so various,
so complex, so subtle, which is perfectly preserved in aphasia, though understand-
ing of words be destroyed. Preserved—and often more: preternaturally enhanced.
Thus the feeling I sometimes have—which all of us who work closely with
aphasiacs have—that one cannot lie to an aphasiac. He cannot grasp your words,
and so cannot be deceived by them; but what he grasps he grasps with infallible
precision, namely the 
 
expression 
 
that goes with the words, that total, spontane-
ous, involuntary expressiveness which can never be simulated or faked, as words
alone can, all too easily. . . .
That is why they laughed at the President’s speech. (Sacks 1987:81)
 
Many thinkers identified with postmodernism do not admit natural aspects of
the self, despite the facts to which case studies such as Sacks’s or the work of Dama-
sio call attention. Yet admitting that we are born with a temperament or biosocial
needs does not disallow possibilities for major change and even transformations of
personality. The self is composed of many ingredients that are not even personal:
our ancestors have a way of finding expression in us, and there are mammal charac-
teristics, not even specific to humans, that nevertheless are crucial for the develop-
ment of the human self, such as play, mother-infant bonding and separation, and
REM dreaming. Consider the spontaneous smile or sob, as Damasio describes the
process:
 
A . . . spontaneous smile that comes from genuine delight or the spontaneous
sobbing that is caused by grief are executed by brain structures located deep in
the brain stem under the control of the cingulate region. We have no means of
exerting direct voluntary control over the neural processes in those regions. We
are about as effective at stopping an emotion as we are about stopping a sneeze.
(1999:48–49)
 
These biosocial characteristics remain essentials of the self, despite recent claims
that there are no essentials, no human nature, no universals, no reality to the self,
and that it is simply a social construction. One reads this in authors such as Rorty,
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who conveys the assumption in quasi-easygoing language. “It’s socialization all the
way down,” he says, reciting a version of socialization as a kind of passive indoctri-
nation into rote conventions, a view that no social science undergraduate could get
away with. Rorty denies the place of biology, experience, extra-conventional mean-
ing, purposiveness, and pragmatic consequences in human conduct: all crucial to the
four original pragmatists. It is why I call Rorty an antipragmatist, a 
 
fragmatist
 
 (Halton
1995:219–46).
Though Rorty frames his theory in terms of conversation, it is the antithesis of
that older Socratic dialogical form of discourse. For Socrates, the purpose of dialogue
is a mutual quest for truth, and philosophy is the loving pursuit of wisdom. Rorty aban-
doned the love of wisdom, abandoned philosophy, saying that it is based on a false con-
ception of a “final vocabulary,” when all there is are conventions and contingencies—
idiosyncratic historical products rather than fallible truths (Rorty 1989:96–97). This
amounts to a denial of the ideas of inquiry in Peirce, Dewey, and Mead.
Rorty also undoes dialogue, as understood by Peirce, Dewey, and Mead. For
them, all thought is an internal dialogue, and all dialogue, the communicative
flow of signs, occurs in a context of normative inquiry. The earlier pragmatists saw
dialogue—inner and outer—as involving the possibility of self-correction. Rorty does
not; dialogue is simply the enacting of conventions and contingent redescriptions.
Far from providing a thoroughgoing account of meaning, Rorty’s theory seems to
me to coalesce with that of the ideal consumer of contemporary consumption culture,
limited to conventional conformism or contingent impulse, purposely essential-less,
essentially purposeless.
Peirce, the originator of pragmatism, began the development of its ideas in a se-
ries of essays that destroyed Cartesian foundationalism. Rorty excludes Peirce from
his consideration, dispensing him as the mere originator of the name “pragmatism,”
ignorant of the significance of Peirce’s fallibilism and its implications for final vo-
cabularies. Peirce is far closer to the spirit of Socrates than is Rorty. Rorty denies
what Socrates stands for—the loving pursuit of wisdom, or 
 
philosophia
 
.
Or consider the psychologist Kenneth Gergen, who says in his book, 
 
The Satu-
rated Self
 
:
 
Thus, interest in “true identities” and “actual characteristics” of persons can be
replaced by concern with the perspectives in which they are constructed. It is in
this context that many scholars have become deeply interested in people’s com-
monsense beliefs about themselves and others, and the impact of these beliefs on
their actions. . . . In all such cases the attention turns from the nature of 
 
real
 
 love,
intelligence, aging, child development, and so on to show how it is 
 
constructed
 
 or
represented in the culture. For good or ill, it is the individual as socially con-
structed that finally informs people’s patterns of action. And in the end, there is
no means of moving past the constructions to locate the real. (1991:146)
 
Clearly selves are constructed in social contexts and relationships, the analysis of
which is the stuff of which the social sciences are made. But many thinkers take this
fact of social construction to mean that social life is necessarily unreal. The good
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news of the postmodern gospel as proclaimed by Baudrillard, Derrida, Lyotard,
Rorty, and Gergen is that the self is relational; the bad news is that the relations are
unreal. All that can be loved is a mere fiction in this damaged view of life, which ex-
cludes the possibility that the narrative of social life can also be real. Though admit-
tedly there are exceptions, such conceptions of the self and of signification as these
figures hold represents a cultural and intellectual expression of the new phase of
alienation and automatism under way in global consumption culture, in my view. It
is more the embrace of the pathology rather than a critical understanding of it, and
Gergen provides a clear example of why.
Gergen discussed Mead in his earlier social-psych work but strangely ignores
him in his writing on what he terms the “relational” self, despite the fact that Mead
developed a relational theory of the self. Gergen’s postmodern self is based in neo-
Saussurean premises that all meaning is conventional or contingent, a nominalist
assumption that is not only too narrow an understanding of signs, but in my opinion
false. Mead’s deeper conception of self, in transaction with its community without
and within—that is, relational—allows that the self is a live experiencing creature,
in contrast to Gergen’s conception of self as a creature of habit, reducible to “social
construction,” to “representation” considered as limited to convention. Mead’s
model allows for social construction, as the term is being used, but it allows further
that nature and experience may be ingredient in social constructing.
Gergen is incapable of delivering a rich understanding of the living self because
he is weighed down with inadequate, obsolete Saussurean semiotics. The shadow of
Saussure’s anorexic understanding of signs is now an unconscious uncritical as-
sumption not only of Gergen, or Rorty, but of the postmodern turn generally (Halton
1986:43–70, 95–105; 1995:79–119). Peirce and Mead allow signs to do many more
things than the Saussurean tradition does: in addition to conventional meaning, signs
touch experience, they are not limited to a conventional disguise for it, abstracted
from it. Human conduct is semeiosis—sign-process—in the pragmatist tradition.
The self is much more than a matrix of societal construction, it is a construction
worker, actively constructing itself while participating in the larger organic and cul-
tural construction and reconstruction that is society and that is the medium for self-
development. Its “bricks” and its body are signs, representations, considered not as
some inhumanoid Saussurean matrix but as living semeiosis: the practice of life is a
practice of signs. When Gergen claims, “And in the end, there is no means of moving
past the constructions to locate the real,” he reveals how little he knows about
signs—the very stuff of which constructions are made.
Reality, far from being unreachable—as the postmodern litany would have it—is it-
self of the nature of a sign: the veil of 
 
maya
 
 that is illusion is also the construction itself.
Hence the idea that it must be either reality or social construction is a false dichotomy.
The originator of pragmatism and of semiotics, Peirce, defined reality as that sign
which will determine social construction to itself in the long run, through the com-
munity of interpretation it engenders. This view is easier to see in natural science
perhaps but gets more complicated in social science, where some conventions are
 98
 
Symbolic Interaction
 
Volume 27, Number 1, 2004
 
not necessarily “true” or ”false.” Yet even there it has application, casting a view of
social construction as a purposive sign-practice ingredient in the ongoing making
of the good life.
Unreal cultural systems can produce unreal selves. Indeed, that is a system re-
quirement of contemporary consumption culture in my view. Yet reality can also
construct real selves, capable of feeling, sensing, experiencing, thinking, and learn-
ing their way in the world. But a real self cannot live from the neck up, as a mental
convention, as Gergen’s selves do, because living from the neck up is the alienation
from the vital sources of self, the bodily passions through which we attune to real
life. Those sensing, imagining, revering, and attuning passions were crucial to the
physical evolution of the anatomically modern humans who walked their way out of
the ice age. This emergent human was neither a Hobbesian psychopathic brute, nor
some antisocial expression of the Freudian “primal horde,” nor a creature whose
consciousness was merely composed of arbitrary conventions. The aboriginal evolu-
tionary social construction of the human body issued forth through its deep, prac-
ticed attunement to the signs of surrounding life. And despite twelve thousand
years of agriculture and civilization, we still inhabit these hunter-gatherer bodies,
made to attune to the myriad signs of surrounding life, made to love the fantastic
reality of life.
Indeed, animism, or the relation, as David Abram (1997) has happily put it, of
the human to the greater-than-human, is the consciousness of the original social
construction of the self, that of the hunter-gatherer. I claim that there is good rea-
son to suspect that the original generalized other was not solely human but also in-
volved a relationship rooted in 
 
participating awareness
 
 of the drama of life. The animals
and plants constituted a forest of symbols with practical and religious significance, and
requiring intense study and rumination over the gestures they communicated. The
animals, plants, and surrounding landscapes peopled the original generalized other
to an extent that civilized consciousness, anthropocentrically enclosed in a human
fabricated world, can scarcely appreciate.
Though many of our cognitive beliefs may have been developed in civilized soci-
eties and their cultural conventions, the self reaches far deeper than this. It reaches
deep into the human body, and that body was refined over many tens of thousands
of years of hunter-gatherer life and developed over an even longer period of homi-
nid, primate, and mammalian evolution. As the ethnographic record demonstrates,
hunter-gatherer societies tend to be deeply ritually based and must continually attune
themselves to the surrounding environment on which they depend.
Animism, usually described as the worship of spirits in trees and stones, and so on,
is more understandable as the reverential attunement of the human to the greater-
than-human. And that greater-than-human is the living environment in which the
sacred play of consumption, of hunting and gathering, occurs. It is a sacred game of
life-forms consuming and being consumed by each other, in which the human gather-
ing or hunting might just as well be prey as predator. As an Amazonian Amahuaca
man put it in describing the dangers of using bird calls to capture the tinamou bird:
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“I backed up between the buttresses of a big tree where the ground could be seen
for a good distance in front of me, and I started calling the birds to me. You know
that it is dangerous to call the tinamou without the protection of a big tree. The jag-
uar sometimes comes in to answer the call! The tinamou is also his favorite bird”
(quoted in Abram 1997:143).
This man reveals a deep awareness of the place of attunement and entrancement
in the drama of the hunt: he must be so immersed in the role of the tinamou that it
believes his call is that of a tinamou. But he must also identify with the tinamou as
prey, aware that the jaguar attunes to its call, and would happily consume it or him.
The more aware of these life-signs surrounding him, the better he can participate in
the entrancement of the hunt. His generalized other is literally a forest of living
symbols. But that very entrancement must have self-critical protections as part of
the awareness.
In the form in which it evolved into its physical being, such a being could not
countenance burning up the forests of the earth and emptying the oceans simply for
commodity gain, as we are now doing, for that being evolved in a greater-than-
human world to which it needed to attune itself to live. Only by relieving it of its
original awareness and attunements could it reach a state in which killing-gain
could replace its habitat-relation. Such relief was originally provided by agricultur-
ally based civilization, its bureaucratic institutions and specialization of labor, later
radically amplified by the mechanical-scientific worldview, now perfecting the sub-
stitution of real life by virtual “living,” mistakenly called virtual reality (Halton
forthcoming).
Such a view not only can now countenance burning mother forest, who originally
gave us life, but also can view the genuine ripe fruits of civilizations, of Mona Lisa
and 
 
Moby-Dick
 
, as one cognitive scientist told me, as mere rules and conventions,
in effect, replaceable parts in a replaceable universe, simply information. This is ra-
tional madness, and is indeed what has been happening. We are burning all of it: the
wisdom of the past, the variescence of the living earth, burning it in utter greed and
hubris.
Scientific materialism is rooted in a conception of the universe as basically com-
posed of dead matter in motion, out of which life springs by chance, yet the word it-
self (Latin, 
 
materia
 
) springs from the life-giving capacity that defines a mother, and
by analogy, the shoot-producing trunk of a tree, “-
 
mater
 
 being the trunk, which pro-
duces the shoots; 
 
mater
 
, therefore, is here a transferred use of 
 
mater
 
, mother” (Par-
tridge 1958:387).
 
 
 
Like many other inversions produced in modern consciousness
and traceable etymologically, the dead matter universe of 
 
materialism
 
 literally de-
rives from the life-giving mother-tree. Behind modern materialism, it would seem,
stands the shadow of what the Ba-mbuti pygmies have called for forty thousand
years Mother Forest.
Sedentary, contemporary globalizing civilizational consciousness seems bent on
achieving autogenocide, and one of its most powerful banners for this process is
what it likes to call “science.” It prides itself by saying that it is scientific, and usually
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means by this that it is beyond ideology, beyond moral obligations, beyond basic
criticisms from outside of its institutional box: it is, in brief, Nietzsche’s 
 
Übermensch
 
,
in a white lab coat. Yet contemporary sci-tech, I claim, functions as an ideological
projection of a worldview that can be termed 
 
the mechanical other
 
.
And the way this colonizing mechanical other typically targets the self is pre-
cisely through the fantastic appearances that will seduce our hunter-gatherer bodies.
Marx’s “fetishism of commodities” is indeed an apt term for this process. When the
mad scientist Rotwang in Fritz Lang’s 1926 classic film, 
 
Metropolis
 
, creates the first
robot, he clothes her in seductive flesh and replaces the mothering Maria and her
message of love that she preaches to the workers with this facsimile sex machine
and its message of hate. Lang was deeply aware of how the rational-mechanical system
of modern life must cover itself in the appearance of flesh, of “all that is human,” if
it is to relieve humanity of self-originated experience by seducing it into machine-
originated experience.
Modern materialist civilization, rooted in the bifurcated thought-versus-thing
world of nominalism, represents a complete inversion of the bodily awareness–
centered, environmentally attuned, reverential self through which we became human.
Indeed, from my perspective it is the social construction of a vast, mechanical, anti-
body whose goal is to eradicate fully incarnate human being and variescent, sponta-
neous life: a virtualized, commodified world with no more vital experience, no real
love, no pullulating dream-world, but only isolate brain-processors, themselves re-
placeable (Mumford 1967, 1970).
Do you believe in your heart of hearts, dear reader, that love is a fiction and only
convention and contingency are “real”? Try to imagine how love might be a reality.
Try to imagine, as figures as diverse as Peirce, Dostoyevsky, and Melville did, how
the social construction of society might even involve such love, as 
 
genuine general
relation
 
, transcending convention and contingency (Halton 1986). “Evolutionary
love,” as Peirce (1931) called it in an essay of that title, is such a genuine general re-
lation. Otherwise, sooner or later, pluralistic dressing or not, one is reduced to the
old Hobbes-World nominalism of contingent nature and conventional culture, in
which all that can be loved is a mere, unreal fiction.
In an interview, Kenneth Gergen could literally not even admit that he loved his
wife, because it clashed with his ideological social constructionism. It wasn’t that he
didn’t love her—in the everyday sense—but that he couldn’t bring himself to use
the word 
 
love
 
 because of his ideological belief in social construction as mere con-
ventional determination of the self. To this his wife, Mary Gergen, also a psycholo-
gist, replied: “Look, when I ask you whether you love me, don’t go through these
tortuous questions of what’s really real about love and how you’d know. Just say the
words meaningfully and I’d be a lot better off” (Stephens 1992:40).
When love—or even feigned love—becomes a word to be avoided, it would
seem that what William James termed vicious intellectualism is at work. Gergen, in
the name of freeing the self, actually confines it to a much narrower position.
Why consider essentialism then? My answer is that antiessentialists falsely
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assume, like their essentialist opponents, that essences are not also signs. This is usu-
ally because antiessentialists are themselves passively indoctrinated into the Saus-
surean theory of signs as limited to conventions. But essences are iconic signs that
signify their own identity. And real selves and works possess identity, their signify-
ing essence. By this, I mean that essence is communicative. A convincing piece of
music, in this sense, has its own identity, its own being, by virtue of what it is and not
only by its difference from everything else. The same holds true for a self. And the
reality of the healthy human self is that it is a multiple personality 
 
order
 
—in con-
trast to the pathology of multiple personality disorder. Yet how the multiple self
that comprises one holds together is often quite mysterious.
As I see it, there is also an element of brute, nondialogical otherness in experi-
ence, which is not at all “constructed” by the self, yet which tempers it. And the feel-
ing, sensing, gesturing, and even speaking self, is not indigenously a mere passive
“social construction” brainwashed by some social matrix—though clearly that “au-
tomatic animal,” reduced to glorying in “life-support” entertainment commodities
seems to be a deliberate goal of contemporary technoconsumption culture. Yet in-
digenously the living self is a construction worker, actively involved in its own social
construction.
Many animals have the ability to sense the specific other as other. For example, a
recent documentary on animal consciousness and the people who interacted with
animals on the animals’ own terms, such as a grizzly bear trainer and the anthropol-
ogist Jane Goodall, showed how such full communicative involvement with the ani-
mals allowed these people to go far beyond lab researchers in understanding, be-
cause they allowed their feelings in the interactions as valid data.
The trainer described his play with the grizzly. At one point as the nine-foot-tall,
two-thousand-pound bear has most of its mouth around the trainer’s head, you can
hear him command: “No teeth!” And he told of how the bear will sometimes test
limits, for example, of how much force it can use, and will be looking out of the cor-
ner of its eye to gauge his response. This seems to me a crucial component of play
fighting (and play in general)—sensing the other through the limits of the interaction.
In this case, the imperative voice gave the limit, where an interrogative voice would
have spelled out to the bear: Free meal!
I had the opportunity, while attending the Society for the Advancement of
American Philosophy meeting in Las Vegas, to speak with a tiger and bird trainer
who was performing down the hall from the meeting. Joe Kratwohl told me how he
was once rehearsing a scene for a film with one of his tigers, how he initiated its at-
tack sequence by feigning running away. The tiger was supposed to catch him and
muzzle the right and left sides of his neck and then stomach, but when it went from
left side of stomach to right side, Kratwohl could feel its teeth emerging and begin-
ning to shift to biting instead of muzzling. He described the pursuit trajectory of a tiger
as “chase, tackle, bite, eat,” a trajectory that can only be broken by superior force.
Sensing the teeth—the instinctive bite phase that was not supposed to be engaged—
Kratwohl immediately grabbed the fifteen-hundred-pound tiger around the neck in
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a choke hold while ramming the base of his hand as hard as possible into its face,
stunning it, while he then muscled it down on its side. This was a conversation of ges-
tures with a vital purpose: Kratwohl’s very survival. The tiger then got up and walked
away in fear, and minutes later, when Kratwohl asked it if it wanted to come over to
him, he told me the tiger, still fearful, “went over to some nearby bushes as if to say,
‘No thank you, think I’ll just smell these bushes over here,’” gesturing submission.
Kratwohl said the tigers he trains must believe that he is more powerful and that
his domination over them alone is what commands their obedience to him. “The
day that I cannot command that obedience and the sense that I am more powerful
is the day that I will no longer be in that cage.” His story illustrates that the most im-
portant animal for the animal trainer to train is himself or herself. The trainer’s own
instinctive responses and bodily attunement are crucial for the live eat-or-be-eaten
dynamics of such situations, and must be available through constant practice and
awareness. Such is how our originating ancestors became human, through intense
awareness to the plants and animals and terrain, and to themselves. There are no
do-overs in this conversation of gestures: Thinking and symbolic verbalizing would
only amount to the message “Eat me.”
 
IDEALS AND PUBLIC VIRTUE: MEGA-REFLEX-ARC-AMERICA
 
Much in contemporary life in America divests Americans not only of public 
 
spaces
 
,
but of the free range of public 
 
gestures
 
 that are ingredient in public life. Consump-
tion dictates usurp free association and often impose standards of conduct designed
to promote consumption and to devalue nonconsuming conduct and rights of citi-
zenship for public assembly (Halton 2000). And these problems are all exacer-
bated in the automatic culture of America, which has been busily replacing for
some time now the practice and institutions of democracy with an ever-expanding
mega-reflex-arc.
In his 1896 paper on the reflex-arc concept, Dewey showed how the stimulus-
response model falsely assumed the stimulus to be a raw, unconditioned starting
point, instead of itself the response to prior social stimuli—cycles, not arcs. Three
years later, in chapter 7 of his groundbreaking book,
 
 The Interpretation of Dreams
 
,
Freud used the same reflex-arc concept Dewey had criticized as the metapsycholog-
ical basis of his theory. He would have done well to have read Dewey’s paper.
The reflex-arc model reduces conduct to conditioning, to a sensationalist model
of psychology ultimately based on pleasure and pain. It excludes the spontaneous
dimension of conduct, and the possibility of autonomy—of self-controlled conduct
oriented by general ends rather than by discrete sensations of pleasure and pain. It
forecloses the genuinely triadic nature of signification. It takes the 
 
per
 
ilous out of
ex
 
per
 
ience through its foreclosure of the conditioned response.
Dewey’s philosophy of conduct provided an alternative to these shortcomings,
and remains a critical alternative to many contemporary outlooks on social life and
meaning that are unable to consider conduct and experience as communicative in
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their own right. Yet Dewey’s center of gravity was in making knowledge-secured-
through-inquiry the outcome of practice and a basis for social reconstruction. He
sought to extend the model of theoretical scientific inquiry to practical life in the
name of pragmatic “instrumentalism.” But is “knowledge” even the right term for
that goal? Is awareness knowledge? Is beauty? Is the practical wisdom of phrone-
sis? Or am I quibbling?
In short, is “knowledge” sufficient for the conduct of life, even when considered
in Dewey’s terms as “habits of conduct,” or does the model of scientific inquiry—no
matter how broadly conceived—remain too restrictive for the practice of public
life? In my opinion it does remain too restrictive, and represents one of the failings
of Dewey’s optimism. He did not fully appreciate how emotions form the prime
vehicle for the arts of the human body itself, in its social practices. Living from the
passions in everyday life is a surer guide for practical conduct than the model of sci-
entific inquiry, though still fallible. The aim of obliterating the divide between scien-
tific theory and the practice of life in the name of democracy failed to consider that
life bears deeper forms of reasonableness than the model of inquiry can encompass,
and that critical intelligence remains embedded in these other forms of intelligence.
Living life by the ideals of inquiry and logic is like dissecting a whale to under-
stand 
 
Moby Dick
 
. Living life attuned to its rhythms is like rolling in the waves with
the white whale itself, alive to the perilous presence of “the ungraspable phantom
of life.” Surely we live life 
 
with
 
 logic and rationality, but we live life 
 
from
 
 our bodies,
whose feeling, sensing, communicating capacities go far deeper than rationality
alone, in my opinion, and form a better basis for conscience. The rational-mechanical
system of modern life assumes a progressively maximizing rational standard of rea-
son, one Max Weber both saw and yet was himself a symptom of. He was unable to
see that a dichotomy of the rational and the nonrational is false, that reason is more
than rationality, and that optimal rationality requires nonrational reasonableness.
Yet the rational is and must be anchored by the deeper extrarational reasonable-
ness of the feeling, sensing self to function optimally.
A new balance of reasonableness is called for, a new kind of civilization that can
reattune to those extrarational bodily capacities as essential for reasonableness
(Montagu and Matson 1983). Those balancing attributes of human nature remain
embedded in the human body. As Nietzsche said in 
 
Beyond Good and Evil
 
,
 
 
 
“To be
mistaken about the rhythm of a sentence is to be mistaken about the very meaning
of that sentence.” Or more succinctly, in the words of Irving Mills and Duke Elling-
ton: “It Don’t Mean a Thing (If It Ain’t Got That Swing)!” A nation cannot make
valid democratic interpretations for long if it does not practice the autonomy re-
quired for democracy. If it shifts to practicing automatic culture instead of autonomy,
it quickly becomes as “democratic” as the former German Democratic Republic.
That, unfortunately, seems to be the state of Reflex-Arc-Macro-Soft-America
today: auto-conditioned mass individuals busily pushing the various “food” buttons
of their cage—money, machines, and all the powers of Mighty Mammon—ready to
stimulate-response themselves without limit unto death. What is the symbol of Las
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Vegas in contemporary American culture if not the mirror and Mecca of Mega-
Reflex-Arc-America, the total addiction environment as desirable destination? It is
one visible symbol of the “invisible dictator” of modern life, the rational, calculating
machine covered in fantastic “flesh.” In the fantastic entertainment complex one
sees the reintroduction of animism’s relation of human to greater-than-human but
in perverted form: with all the natural life of the desert shut out of view of the
magic casino-enclosed environments, the greater-than-human now appears as
the Megamachine itself.
The cultural symbol of “Las Vegas” personifies the broader entertainment com-
plex, which functions as a cryptoreligious symbol of the mechanical other, part of
the larger body-mind-soul-numbing consumption culture at work, whose system re-
quirements seem to involve disabling the emotions by providing virtual substitutes.
The entire entertainment complex, especially including its pervasive kitsch, func-
tions to give the rational-mechanical system the appearance of a human face. In
that guise the mechanical other more easily infiltrates the human self, toward an
end of rendering it the “software” of the system. Through its ever more pervasive
advertising—which now exposes Americans to three and a half thousand ads per
day—the system indoctrinates people to identify commercial desires as their own,
materialistic fantasies as the dreams of which their selves are made. Welcome to the
matrix!
The end result is a consumption-addicted, increasingly obese population of
couch potatoes pushing the stimulus-response buttons of their consumption cages,
ever more emptied of their real lives as feeling, passionate beings, ever more re-
moved from living in truth by consumption kitsch. Advertising is the opiate of the
people. Democracy cannot survive for long by living on automatic.
The life of democracy requires critical autonomy. I am exercising my critical au-
tonomy in criticizing my society for its loss of critical autonomy. I was also pushing
buttons on my computer writing these words, so I do not claim to be completely
free from the tentacles of the reflex-arc: and who can, especially if you have chil-
dren in this culture.
But it is pathological: pathological materialist excess. Take the obesity epidemic
that began to spread in the 1990s, as an article in the Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association (Mokdad et al. 1999) put it, “with the speed and dispersion charac-
teristic of a communicable disease epidemic.” For an epidemic of the public vice of
gluttony to emerge across all age, race, class, and gender lines this quickly, some-
thing obviously has to be eating Americans. In my opinion it is nothing less than
pathological material consumption compulsions masking inner emptiness and de-
pression. Thus, consumptive America, pushing the buttons that anesthetize, is the
Mega-Reflex-Arc auto-conditioning its tired, isolated mass self.
Now antibiotics have been abused by the meat industry in ways humans are be-
ginning to pay for. But who would have thought that Americans would conduct bio-
logical warfare on ourselves, using fat as the weapon! But effective weapon it is, a
very good weapon to lower awareness, to keep the potato on the couch, reduced to
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mentalized button pushing through the mirage of “eat me” images and commercial
soul seductions. The Couch Potato is perhaps the penultimate perverse perfection
of the sedentary creature brought into being through agriculture and civilization.
What better way to alienate people from the human body, the very temple of our
signifying nature, than to encase us in it. The obesity epidemic is one indicator of
larger anticorporeal purposes at work, for Americans have also developed similar
patterns of alienation from the body in other domains. Home cooking less while
eating more, the automated American is also underslept and underwalked, over-
worked and overspent, for these deprivations enhance compliance and reduced
awareness. Aware, autonomous citizens do not possess the compliance capabilities
of unaware, automatic consumers, “couched” in the hypnotic visage of the electro-
Tele-Medusa.
The postdemocratic consumption creature is the antithesis of the democratic
citizen, capable of phronesis. Automated, unaware consciousness, conditioned
by the stimulus-response/pleasure-pain matrix, is intrinsically depressing. Such
pathology can be addressed as gestures of alienation, of an inner world colo-
nized by the mechanical other and turned to serve largely as its self-replicating
software.
This introduces one of the great challenges we face today, it seems to me. How
might the all-powerful, globalizing Corporate Empire be transformed to face and
attune itself to organic limitations—limitations of the earth’s bounty, of global human
population, of the biosphere itself, of self-responsible societies and spontaneous
selves? If it cannot, then there is nothing more to be said, and it should not take
more than about twenty years for this globally, electronically, virally, economically,
and spiritually interconnected world to collapse from its excesses as suddenly as the
World Trade Center did in a single day. But to deny that it is also a human entity,
however dehumanizing, seems to me to surrender to the myth of the machine as
some alien thing that is not also a human social construction. That is an alienated
view of the mechanical other, in my opinion. No matter how dehumanizing, corpo-
rations and machines remain human social organizations that ought to be means,
not ends, of life.
Awareness, no matter how painful the reality of which one becomes aware, is
intrinsically satisfying, and is rooted in self-originated experience. More aware-
ness is what Americans need, especially a general arousal of the visceral awareness
that democracy itself has also been under siege from within, lulled into the false
security that technomachines could provide security, happiness, and a life. Wild
entrancement taps deeper into our bodies, and advertising only wishes it could
really go there. But it can’t. It must honor its capitalist stimulus-response mechan-
ical outlook, its addictive hook of virtual entrancement and simulated life. Full-
bodied awareness, rooted in self-originated experience and the purposes it en-
genders, can provide a means to democratic life. Consumption itself, to be
healthy, must be rooted in acts of awareness and not of dependency, seduction,
and addiction.
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PUBLIC VIRTUES AND GROUP IMPROVISATIONS
You see, there’s such a thing as a feeling tone. . . . And if you don’t have this,
baby, you’ve had it.
—Terkel 1967
Music is language of the emotions; it is a test of life. . . . Everyone reacts to music
in a different way and everyone should be able to make it on his own—play and
write the music the way he feels it. If he is going to be really great, he must learn
to be himself.
—Mingus 1961
Is the individual the ultimate source of ethics? Perhaps the answer is yes, if meant
as focal point of ultimate responsibility. But there are also public virtues and group
improvisations not reducible to individuals per se. Both social conventions and public
virtues can be sources of moral behavior, the morality of the former consisting
in the customs, norms, and ideals of conduct, the morality of the latter consisting in
the living act itself. I distinguish the virtuous public act from ideal conduct because
the character of the virtuous act itself is the source of the morality rather than its
conformity to an ideal of conduct: it primarily bodies forth its own end and is only
secondarily a means to a good end. In this sense a virtuous act involves spontaneous
creative intelligence in order to sense the situation and act rightly.
Spontaneous conduct is more than impulsivity, which is a blind giving in to the
moment as a kind of response to a stimulus. In this, impulsivity, like a purely condi-
tioned response, lacks autonomy. In Mega-Reflex-Arc-America, consumption dic-
tates that the two together—the impulsive, yet conditioned, response—form the
ideal consumer, conditioned to conform to conventional stimuli. By contrast, spon-
taneity means being able to act freely in the moment, and is in this sense a culmina-
tion of practice—of self-originated experience—rather than raw starting point.
Many people think that musical improvisation is just letting go and allowing
whatever randomly pops out to pop out. In the 1940s and 1950s avant-garde alea-
tory (meaning chance) music of John Cage and others, and later, in some of the
more extreme elements of avant-garde jazz in the 1960s, this approach was pursued
as a means of freedom.
But it turned out to be a cage, not only in music. You can’t make music that way,
by blind impulsiveness, only sound results. For even the ear itself requires a past in
order to make the present intelligible: the fantasy of Cartesian immediate intuitive
self-consciousness that came to dominate the avant-garde in the twentieth century
was a mirage: the past cannot be completely expunged without expunging the ex-
punger. This music was a cultural indicator of the failure of nominalism, of its col-
lapse of the signifying moment into the fiction of the stimulus-response reflex-arc.
The dyadic stimulus-response ideal of modern materialism is a fiction that must
ignore the reality of the triadic sign that constitutes the signifying moment. The sig-
nifying moment involves its past, its body and soul so to speak, bodied forth in the
present in intelligible communication addressed to a future other, to an interpreting
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sign. It may be a “conversation of gestures” with the other, or it may be a “signifi-
cant symbol” addressed to the generalized other without or within, or it may be
both.
It is that element of signification that pours forth, bodies forth, as phronesis, the
living involvement of the self with the situation in which it is engaged. My terminol-
ogy may draw heavily here from the world of semiotics, yet the signifying moment
could also be described as the world of the hunter-gatherer, immersed through bodily
awareness in sensing the drama of life in which he or she is participating, live to the
moment. Yet again, the signifying moment could be described as improvisation.
Improvisation is and must be a culmination of a practice, a practice that in the
case of music puts the craft of the instrument and the music in the performer’s
hands or tongue, in the body and soul so that it can be born anew in the making of
the music. Consider, for the moment, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s claim from his book,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, that “the world is all that is the case” (“Die Welt ist
alles was die Fall ist”). And in the conclusion he stated: “What can be said at all can
be said clearly, and what we cannot we must pass over in silence.” This is the voice
of tragic, overweening rationalism, which would silence, not only fallibility, but pre-
conscious sensibility and gestural and figurative communication.
Just which world is “all that is the case”? The physical things-go-bump world? Or
the world of thought? Or the infinite imaginary worlds: worlds of dreams, the world
of what Blake termed the Poetic Imagination, mathematical worlds? If early Witt-
genstein thought only the denotative thing-world is the case, he was plainly wrong,
in my opinion.
We can talk about things without having to talk about them picture perfectly. If
Wittgenstein only meant to say, “put up or shut up,” that is, be perfectly clear or be
silent, even then, he expressed it in a mystical-sounding but obscurantist way. Yet I
thought he meant more, that there is a “picture theory of reality” philosophers are
limited to, and that the more ultimate concerns of ethics and aesthetics lie beyond
this. If that is his case, it remains an utterly anorexic conception of ethics and aes-
thetics, and perhaps he saw past it in his turn to “language games” in his later work.
The ethical, which the ancient Greeks saw as the public realm of speech and ac-
tion, is diabolically banished to the private realm of silence in Wittgenstein’s early
“final solution” (his term). Yet as Thomas Mann’s Mephistopheles puts it in Dr.
Faustus: “That is the secret delight and security of hell, that it is not to be informed
on, that it is protected from speech, that it just is, but cannot be public in the news-
paper, be brought by word to any critical knowledge.” In this sense early Wittgen-
stein was another manifestation of the privatizing of virtue in modern culture, and
of the forcing of signification into logico-reductive modes.
Concerning that which cannot be said clearly having to be passed over in silence,
one can sing for starters, and paint and dance and engage in the myriad other forms
of communication that can express the extralinguistic. In science one can hypothe-
size, which is the form of inference Peirce termed “abductive,” and which is a logical
form of extrarational conjecture. Or to return to the case of improvisation in music,
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the musical object so improvised is precisely that in which new possibilities are con-
stantly being discovered by the musician in attunement with the ongoing music. In
group improvisation that attunement to the groove—the feel of the rhythm—and to
the musical voices of the other musicians is all the more crucial.
This empathic listening and musical dialoguing is all about speaking clearly—not
by mere words, but in and through the conversation of musical gestures. Extralin-
guistic musical gestures “speak” the soul, whereas “talking about music is like danc-
ing about architecture,” as Thelonius Monk once said to quiet a critic’s question. In
ensemble playing, new possibilities are being codiscovered in the creative spontane-
ous intelligence of the ensemble itself through self-originated experience.
The signifying moment speaks itself.
And in the origins of jazz, the living gesture spoke itself from dens of vice. Virtue-
breeding vice dens, where the energies of life flowed free, and the spontaneous self
projected new worlds, wholly new gestures by which to imagine and communicate
what a free life can be. Beyond the beauty of the music, the art of jazz eloquently tes-
tifies to how living freely involves exercising the spontaneous self.
“IF I COULD TELL YOU WHAT IT MEANT”
If Lao-Tzu said that those who know don’t speak, and those who speak don’t
know, he must not know.
—Anonymous
Imagination is the inner voice through which we are connected to nature, and which
speaks to us usually through preverbal utterances, presentiments ranging from
dream-signs to art creations to scientific hypotheses. Imagination is ominous in the
literal sense of the term. If we call it the voice of “abductive inference,” Peirce’s
term for a third form of inference that he claimed is not reducible to deductive or
inductive inference, we frame it logically, legitimating it as realism and pragmatism.
But like the poets William Blake and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the scientist-
semiotician Peirce understood that nature had an inward side and that modern
nominalistic science was unscientific to exclude the qualitative and inward side of
nature in the name of mechanism.
In carving out the logic of abduction, dry logician Peirce found the missing link
between that inner life the romantics celebrated in the face of modernizing nomi-
nalistic civilization and its objectivist opposite. More than a missing link, he found
the very heart by which the two sides could again communicate. He found a way to
give voice to the inner voice of nature, the inner voice whose eradication is a prime
goal of the machine of modern civilization. And remarkably, he did so through a
scientific conception of logic, considered as semeiotic.
For final purpose, you see, was evicted by nominalized mechanical civilization in
name only. In reality it became the cryptoreligious, dark, inverted underside: the
goal of antisocial Hate, with its one-sided avatar Homo competitor, and more re-
cently, zoon automaton, who lives and dies by calculation, by the inner dictator of
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modern life, the mechanical other. Spontaneous intelligence, in living dialogue with
its inner and outer environments, the reality that made us human—in awareness, in
wonder—must be rendered a mere fiction by the calculating consciousness of the
mechanical other. Yet the spontaneous intelligence of the living environment that
formed the original generalized other to whom emergent humans attuned themselves
remains the ineradicable reality of the human body, against which the automatic cal-
culating consciousness of the mechanical other is an overweening infantile projection.
But imagination remains ominous, dark, brooding, often surfacing within one
willy-nilly. It speaks from the whole brain, not simply the small, verbal portion, and
from that deeper mind of nature incorporated both in the human brain and in the
wider world to which that brain is indigenously made to be attuned. It involves
vastly more than the verbal brain-sliver the philosophic tongue-lovers call language.
Without imagination, without the ability to make those in-formed guesses or abduc-
tive inferences, science is impossible, for it is only through abductive inferences that
new information validly enters science. File it all under “Omenclature.”
The imaginative practice we call art is not about knowledge; it is about bodying
forth feelings and embodying them in felt form. If artists really knew what it was
they are impelled to bring to form, they wouldn’t need to make art. They could be
scholars. But being not-knowing beings, possessed by feelings they need to bring to
awareness through embodying them, artists make art. They must make art. That is
why the great modern dancer Isadore Duncan said, “If I could tell you what it
meant, there would be no point in dancing it,” and why the painter Barnett New-
man stated, “Aesthetics is for the artists as ornithology is for the birds.” Art feels
what mind knows later, feels and gestures it into being in the signifying moment. In
this sense great art does not imitate life, rather, it becomes life.
There is an inner necessity that grabs hold of the artist in the act of making art.
But that inner necessity is itself an element of creation, not an already fixed form.
That inner necessity is also in an active process of creation, indeed, is one of its psy-
chopodia, “Soul limbs,” determined to find form.
Though his work draws attention to the varieties of social influences on works of
art and choices made in their production, Howard Becker’s (2001) theoretical ap-
proach is also constrained by a limited nominalist view of signification as either con-
ventions or instances, denying the possibility that “the work itself” lives in the signi-
fying moment. Similarly, dreams are not simply passive neural “events,” nor are
they, as William Domhoff (2001:13–33) claims, “the accidental by-product of two
great evolutionary adaptations, sleep and consciousness.” Dreaming is a great mam-
mal in-visioning achievement and practice, and touchstone to the living wildness
within the human body (Halton 1992:119–39).
Consider D. H. Lawrence’s description of “the business of art” as revealing “the re-
lation between man and his circumambient universe, at the living moment.” It could
just as easily be a description of hunter-gatherer animism. Lawrence eloquently
shows how art personifies the signifying moment, which ultimately is that triadic re-
lation between person, situation, and emanating sign of spontaneous intelligence:
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The business of art is to reveal the relation between man and his circumambient
universe, at the living moment. As mankind is always struggling in the toils of
old relationships, art is always ahead of the “times,” which themselves are always
in the rear of the present moment. . . . When van Gogh paints sunflowers, he re-
veals, or achieves, the vivid relation between himself, as man, and the sunflower,
as sunflower, at that quick moment of time. His painting does not represent the
sunflower itself. We shall never know what the sunflower itself is. And the cam-
era will visualize the sunflower far more perfectly than van Gogh can. . . . The
vision on the canvas is a third thing, utterly intangible and inexplicable, the off-
spring of the sunflower itself and van Gogh himself. The vision on the canvas is
for ever incommensurable with the canvas, or the paint, or van Gogh as a human
organism, or the sunflower as a botanical organism. You cannot weigh nor
measure nor even describe the vision on the canvas. It exists, to tell the truth,
only in the much-debated fourth dimension. In dimensional space it has no
existence. . . . It is a revelation of the perfected relation, at a certain moment, be-
tween a man and a sunflower. It is neither man-in-the-mirror nor flower-in-the-
mirror, neither is it above or below or across anything. It is in-between every-
thing, in the fourth dimension.
And this perfected relation between man and his circumambient universe is
life itself, for mankind. It has the fourth-dimensional quality of eternity and per-
fection. Yet it is momentaneousness. (Lawrence 1936:527)
“Momentaneousness,” yet having the “fourth-dimensional quality of eternity
and perfection,” such is the wonder one experiences in the presence of art. Art is
the living gesture of life, whether embodied in visual, musical, dramatic, or bodily
form. As such, it is the living sign of the spontaneous gesture that is our birthright
and ultimate human goal. For if life means anything more than sporting, in Dar-
win’s sense, it has for its ultimate purport the participation in the ongoing creation
of the universe. The Native American expression “To walk in beauty” conveys the
ultimate aim of life far more accurately and deeply than the term knowledge, “pos-
sessed” by so-called Homo sapiens.
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, the old adage goes. The same holds true
for a being that would define itself as man “the knower.” Man the maniac brainiac
might be more accurate.
Consider again Oliver Sacks’s words on music and narrative, from a case study of
a retarded patient named “Rebecca”:
The power of music, narrative and drama is of the greatest practical and theoret-
ical importance. One may see this even in idiots, with IQs below 20 and the ex-
tremest motor incompetence and bewilderment. Their uncouth movements may
disappear in a moment with music and dancing—suddenly, with music, they
know how to move. . . . This procedural defect, or motor idiocy, as one might call
it, which completely defeats any ordinary system of rehabilitative instruction,
vanishes at once if music is the instructor. All this, no doubt, is the rationale, or
one of the rationales, of work songs.
What we see, fundamentally, is the power of music to organ-ise—and to do
this efficaciously (as well as joyfully!), when abstract or schematic forms of or-
ganisation fail. Indeed, it is especially dramatic, as one would expect, precisely
when no other form of organisation will work. Thus music, or any other form of
The Living Gesture and the Signifying Moment 111
narrative, is essential when working with the retarded or apraxic—schooling or
therapy for them must be centred on music or something equivalent. And in
drama there is still more—there is the power of role to give organisation, to con-
fer, while it lasts, an entire personality.The capacity to perform, to play, to be,
seems to be a “given” in human life, in a way which has nothing to do with intel-
lectual differences. One sees this with infants, one sees it with the senile, and one
sees it, most poignantly, with the Rebeccas of this world. (Sacks 1987:185–66)
“The power of role to give organisation, to confer, while it lasts, an entire person-
ality”: isn’t this just what Mead was attempting to say? Sacks’s neurological cases
lend support to Mead’s developmental model of the self and the more general prag-
matic outlook on biology and culture as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. But
Sacks goes further to show what is usually completely passed over in discussions of
social roles: he poignantly and eloquently illustrates the power of role, of its en-
trancing abilities while it lasts to transform the person.
Such entrancing is no mere social construction ideology, brainwashed into us, but
stems from the deepest parts of our brains and evolutionary history (Barfield 1973).
Consider, for example, that six billion humans—including you and me, dear reader—
and countless billions of mammals will dream entranced tonight, and tomorrow
night, and every night, and would soon die if we did not. Is that “ephemeral”? The
human body requires the stages of sleep, and the entrancing dream-consciousness
that is an element of sleep, to survive and thrive.
For the conversation of gestures is ultimately at base the ability to entrance the
other through ritual repartee. More, it is participation in the entrancing itself. It is the
entrancement of attraction, of aggression, of hot intimacy in making love, of
“psyching out” opponents in games and sports, of a 180-pound man conveying su-
perior force to a 1,500-pound tiger, of a mother’s gaze attuned to that of her infant,
of the self-transcending “moments” of spectacle and public life. It is the rich under-
current of bodily emotional signs that are ever present in human interaction, con-
veying precise, unworded information.
The conversation of gestures opens to the general conversation of nature, to the
full symphony of participation consciousness that is nature’s inner voice. Here, per-
haps, we must leave Mead behind, though he opened the door to the deeper neuro-
metaphysics of the conversation of nature.
The generalized other is not limited to the human community we internalize, that
is the prejudice introduced by civilizational consciousness, enclosed, as it were, within
its city walls of the mind. Nor is the generalized other reducible to the mechanical
universe of modern life, incapable of conceiving generality—that is, signification—as
real. The generalized other involves our participation in a living, signifying, circum-
ambient environment, found originally in our attunement to and conversation with
the animals and plants and elements on which we depended for our life. This origi-
nal template was what the “biped who did not yet speak” conversed with, as the
conversation of gestures evolved into the significant symbol of the human self.
When we walked away from the attunement of the human to the greater-than-
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human, when we began that glorious march of history, of agriculturally based civili-
zations and anthropocentric consciousness, attuned to human power itself, we
thought we left our “primitive” participation consciousness behind. But it remains
an indelible aspect of human being, of self-originated experience, despite our cur-
rent alienation from it. Real freedom is wild entrancement, found in these very
bodies from which we walked ourselves out of the Pleistocene era, attuned to the
greater-than-human environment of life: Wild entrancement in love and learning, in
child development and in deepening maturity.
The earlier developmental stage of the conversation of gestures remains as an ir-
reducible mode of bodying-forth communication, even as it is also embedded in the
later conversation of significant gestures. For in music and dance and drama, and in
the engaging rituals that punctuate public and private life, it is precisely the loss of
self-reflection through entrancement that provides entrance to the fully participat-
ing, spontaneous self.
In the words of the medieval sufi poet Rumi:
We have fallen into the place
where everything is music.
Stop the words now.
Open the window in the center of your chest,
and let the spirits fly in and out. (1997:34–35)
NOTE
1. The first version of this article was presented at a session of the Society for the Advancement of
American Philosophy. My thanks for comments from fellow panel members—all sociologists—
Harold Orbach, Dmitri Shalin, and Hans Joas. The continued marginality of George Herbert
Mead in American philosophy remains curious. I am also indebted to Arthur Glass for bringing
the etymology of phronesis to my attention in an Internet discussion.
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